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The crimes which we will discuss fall into the wide class of 
offences against the public administration which more particularly impede 
or interfere with the proper administration of justice. These crimes are dealt 
with in our code in Sec 99 to 110; the salient offences being: 
1. calumnious accusation; 
2. simulation of an offence; 
3. perjury; 
4. retraction; 
5. false swearing. 
In the course of the discussion we will refer to the writings of 
Italian jurists which have laid the foundations of these sections in our code. 
A. Calumnious Accusation: 
This subject is dealt with in Section 99 of our Criminal Code 
which lays down that: 
"99. (1) Whosoever, with intent to harm any person, shall accuse 
such person before a competent authority with an offence of 
which he knows such person to be innocent, shall, for the mere 
fact of having made the accusation, on conviction, be liable -
(a) to imprisonment for a term from thirteen to eighteen 
months, if the false accusation be in respect of a crime 
liable to a punishment higher than the punishment of 
imprisonment for a term of two years; 
(b) to imprisonment for a term from six to nine months if the 
false accusation be in respect of a crime liable to a 
punishment not higher than the punishment of imprison-
ment for a term of two years; but not liable to the 
punishments established for contraventions; 
(c) to imprisonment for a term from three days to three 
months, if the false accusation be in respect of any other 
offence. 
(2) Where the crime is committed with intent to extort money 
or other effects, the punishment shall be increased by one 
degree. 
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An analysis of this section reveals the three constituent elements 
of this crime which are: 1) accusation of an offence made to a competent 
authority; 2) intent to harm the person accused and 3) knowledge on the 
part of the accuser of the innocence of the person accused. 
1) According to Section 529 of the Criminal Code any person 
may give information to the police of any offence liable to prosecution "ex 
Officio" of which he may have in any way become aware. Moreover, in 
Section 532 it is laid down that any person who considers himself aggrieved 
by any offence and who may wish proceedings to be taken for the 
punishment of the offender, if known or if unknown, in case he be 
discovered, may make an instance or complaint to any officer of the police. 
There are only two ways in which notice of the commission of an offence 
may be given to the police not to mention the "notizia criminis" whereby 
public officers are expressly bound by law to give notice of any offence of 
which they may have become aware in the execution of their duties. 
However then the law speaks of accusation in this section it refers to any 
way in which a notice may be given to the competent authority. It is not 
necessary that it be done formally under the law of procedure as was 
decided in Police vs Karmenu Mifsud (1935). A point which arises here is 
whether to constitute the crime, the accusation (denunzia) of the offence 
must be spontaneous or whether it is enough if there is an element of 
volition. In Police vs N. Brincat et. (1951), it was held "il-kelma 'jakkui:a' 
ghandha tiftiehem fis-sens tal-kelma 'jiddenunzia' u hemm din id-denunzia 
meta 1-informazzjoni falza tigi moghtija lill-awtorita mhux biss 
volontarjament imma ukoll spontaneament, b'mod li fl-att tad-denunzjant 
ikun hemm certa inizjativa". 1 It went on to say that if there is no element of 
spontaneity in the making of the accusation only the charge of defamation 
would arise. In Pulizija vs Nazzarenu Borg (1965), the accusation lacked the 
element of spontaneity and therefore the accused was found guilty only of 
defamation. 
However Antolisei contends that the 'denuncia' does not have 
to be spontaneous. Another point to mention is that the accusation must be 
of an offence, i.e. a fact which has the character of a criminal wrong be it 
only a contravention. If the fact is not a criminal offence the competent 
authorities may not be moved to institute proceedings against the person 
accused and it is only in such case that such person may be exposed to injury 
through the misdirected istrumentality of penal justice. Thus in Police vs 
Vincenzo Attard (1949), it was stated that: "Biex ikun hemm ir-reat ta' 
falza denunzja hemm bi:onn Ii d-denunzja falza tkun dwar delitt jew 
kontravenzjoni li jaghtu lok ghal azzjoni kriminali persegwibili quddiem il-
Qorti ta' Gustizzja Kriminali. Ghaldaqstant minn jiddenunzja falzament 
membru tal-pulizija li naqas mid-dmirijiet tieghu ghalkemm jista' jgib 
konsegwenzi serji skond 1-0rdinanza tal-Pulizija mhux hati ta' kalunja" 1 
In Police vs Giuseppe Attard (1950) (Mr Justice Montanaro 
Gauci) the court held that in so far as the accusation made is not in respect of 
I. Police v. Vincenzo Attard (1949) - Law Reports Vol. XXXIII Part N p.963. 
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an offence subject to a criminal action before a criminal court, there is no 
calumnious accusation even if such an accusation may subject the person 
concerned to disciplinary action before an authority other than the criminal 
court. 
2) The second element refers to the intent to harm the person 
accused. The accuser who believes another person to be guilty or else 
suspects him to be guilty is not guilty of calumnious accusation even if the 
person is later found innocent. This statement manifests the crucial require-
ments of our law with regard to the specific intent of this offence. 
Therefore the law could not reasonably punish the accuser who would not 
have acted from malice or would have acted rashly or with patent 
imprudence without pondering on the consequences of the accusation. 
The harm to which reference is here made may merely consist in 
exposing the victim to the possibility of criminal proceedings being 
taken and punishment awarded against him. This principle was well 
expounded in the case Police vs Violet Smith: "Huwa veru Ii skond il-ligi 
Maltija biex jigi ntegrat delitt ta' kalunja huwa mehtieg I-element 
intenzjonali fis-sens illi il-kalunjatur irid ikun ghamel ir-rapport falz bil-
hsieb Ii jaghmel hsara Iii xi hadd; imma hu pacifiku illi dan ifisser illi hu 
biii:ejjed Ii l-kalunjatur ikun jaf illi l-inkolpat kien innocenti tar-reat lilu 
attribwit u l-kalunjatur ma jistax jghid Ii dan I-element huwa nieqes meta 
huwa ma setax kien ingannat meta ghamel ir-rapport, u ghalhekk ma jistax 
jghid Ii kien in 'bona fede' meta ghamel l-istess rapport"2 However this 
does not entail the necessity of indicating the person accused by name. 
According to Pessina, since the essence of calumnious 
accusation is the possibility of criminal proceedings, a person who accuses 
another of criminal offence which can only be dealt with on the com-
plaint of the injured party is not guilty of calumnious accusation. A 
formal complaint of the injured party is needed. Furthermore calumnious 
accusation cannot arise when a person is accused of an offence which has 
been extinguished or barred. 3 
Italian jurists hold different views on the issue of whether a 
calumnious accusation is committed by a person for the purpose of saving 
himself from a charge. Carrara admits impunity for the calumny committed 
for the purpose of saving oneself from a capital charge but not in other 
minor cases. The best solution however is given by Mortara i.e. "ii diritto di 
difesa non si puo spingere fino al punto di legittimare una lesione cosl grave 
della personalita altrui' '. 4 
3) The knowledgt on the part of the accuser of the innocence of 
the person accused constitutes the specific formal elements of the crime 
which requires both the design to injure and the knowledge of the innocence 
of the accused. In fact, in Police vs Mary Dark, the court, after listing the 
three elements of the offence of calumnious accusation, stated that "mhux 
2. Police v. Violet Smith - Law Reports Vol. XXXVI (d) p.767. 
3. Pessina, Vol. III, p.251. 
4. Mortara, para. 1097. 
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bizzejjed li jirrikorru 1-ewwel i:ewg elementi. Jekk ma jirrikorix ukoll 1-ahhar 
element ma hemmx reat ta falsa denunzia". The knowledge of the 
accused's innocence must be certain. In Rex vs Katerina Debono it was held 
that "perche si verifichi la calumnia diretta occorre oltre alla falsa denunzia 
fatta con animo di nuocere il denunziato, la cognizione nel denunziante 
contemporanea alla denunzia dell'innocenza del denunziato". 5 Here alone 
can it be said that the accuser had deliberately and maliciously made the 
false imputation. The mere falsity is not alone sufficient for it might have 
been stated involontarily out of supposition. Any false accusation without 
the element of malice may only give rise to a responsibility of negligence for 
civil purposes. 
Carrara states that "Bisogna cioe che non solo l'accusato abbia 
dichiarato l'innocenza propria ma di piu che sia dimostrata dell'offeso che lo 
denunzio come autore del delitto la cognizione di tale innocenza". 6 In 
Police vs Maria Caruana "I-element intenzjonali fir-reat ta' kalunja huwa 
insitu fix-xjenza tal-falsita jigifieri illi ma jistghax jinghad, Ii ma jirrikorrix 
I-element morali mehtieg ghar-reat ta' kalunja jekk 1-imputat kien jaf li 1-
addebitu minnu maghmul ma kienx veru". 
The knowledge of innocence must be present when the person 
makes the accusation. This emerges clearly from the wording of Section 99 
which considers the crime complete by the mere act of laying the 
information or making the complaint. Hence, calumnious accusation is a 
typical formal offence and consequently there can never be an attempted 
calumny. If a person gets to know of another's innocence after accusation is 
made, such a person is not guilty of calumny even if he persists in his 
accusation and subsequently adds further discriminating statements. 
A final question to be considered is whether the crime of 
calumny subsists only in the case in which an accusation is made against an 
innocent person or also in the case in which the responsibility is falsely 
aggravated. Many writers including Impallomeni hold that even in such a 
case the calumny subsists since the accusation is attributing an offence 
which strictly speaking the offender had not really committed or would 
have committed in part. 7 However other writers remark that the law in the 
crime of calumnious accusation punishes the false information or complaint 
and therefore the injury caused to the administration of justice by the 
partial falsity is set off by the advantage of a discovered offence and the 
punishment of an offender. 
Some continental codes and text books deal with calumnious 
accusation under another form namely the fabrication of false evidence 
which our law lays down as a separate offence under Section 109. Whereas 
the false accusation we have already dealt with, made orally or in writing by 
any information, report or complaint constitutes the calumnious accusation 
properly so called verbal or direct, this other form consisting in falsely 
5. Rex v. Katerina Debona (1919) - Law Reports Vol. XXIV parte 2, p.886. 
6. Carrara, Programma, Porte Speciale, para. 2623. 
7. lmpallomeni, Cadice Penale Italiano lllustrato, Vol. II p.249. 
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fabricating factual evidence of an offence against an innocent person, 
constitutes the calumnious accusation known as real or indirect. For 
instance, Crivellari mentions the case of a knife full of blood or a stolen 
object put in the house of the accused. The offender does not have to go and 
report the crime. It suffices that the offender knew the police were about to 
search the house or other personal affects of the person on whom he wants 
to let the blame fall. 8 
Carrara after making the division into verbal and real 
calumnious accusation further subdivides verbal calumnious accusation 
into materiale "quando s'inventa un delitto non esistente, per imputarlo ad 
una determinata persona ... speciale quando un delitto vero s'imputa a chi 
non vi ebbe parte ... ; formate se il delitto vero s'imputa al vero deliqucnte, 
ma con circostanze false che ne modifichino la procresi criminosa". 9 
B. Simulation of Offence: 
Section 109 (2) deals with the crime of simulation of offence and 
lays down: 
"Whosoever shall lay before the executive police any 
information regarding an offence knowing that such offence 
has not been committed, or shall falsely devise the traces of an 
offence in such a manner that criminal proceedings may be 
instituted for the ascertainment of such an offence, shall, on 
conviction be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
1 year". 
The simulation of an offence is considered as a crime.because of 
the injury which it does to the administration of justice by misleading it. This 
crime differs from that of calumnious accusation in as much as in the simula-
tion of an offence there is no specific accusation against any determinate 
person and there is not therefore the intent to cause an innocent person to be 
unjustly convicted or charged. Moreover the crime of calumnious 
accusation does not, like this crime, presuppose the inexistence of the 
material fact. 
Like calumny, as was said in Police vs Thomas Sapiano (1959) 
"is-simulazioni ta' reat tista' tkun tant verbali jew diretta, kemrn ukoll reali 
jew indiretta ... Jekk id-denunzjant jiddenunzja reat li kien jaf li ma sarx 
izda ma jaghmel xejn biex johloq it-tracci ta' dak ir-reat hu jkun hati hiss 
ta' simulazioni verbali jew diretta. Biex ikun hati anki tal-forma tas-
simulazioni reali jew indiretta, hemm bzonn li tracei tar-reat jigu minnu 
realment u materjalment creati' '. 
The simulation may be of any offence (i.e. a crime or a 
contravention) and it must be made in a manner as to make possible the 
initiation of criminal proceedings for the ascertainment of the supposed 
offence. The specific malice of this crime consists in the intent to deceive or 
8. Crivellari, // Codice Penale, Volume Sesto, (1895). 
9. Carrara, Programma, op. cit., para. 2613. 
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mislead justice by denouncing or making appear an offence which is known 
not to have been committed and not in the intent to harm directly by the 
simulation any other person. 
Article 367 of the Italian Penal Code speaks of such fabricated 
offences and Article 369 speaks of false self-accusation whereby one 
declares falsely to be the perpetrator or an accomplice of a crime to which he 
was an outsider. As to the latter offence, Crivellari says that such a person 
should not be punished as nobody exposes himself to an unmerited 
punishment unless he has a proper motive to rid himself of guilt, unless he 
has a grave reason. But despite this, the code caters for this hypothesis and 
is favoured by Crivellari as it is the case of a person who plays around with 
justice and can lessen the trust of citizens in public security, thus rendering 
unpunished the true offender. Crivellari considers only one case in which 
the accuser commits a merciful sacrifice in directing the accusation to the 
salvation of a relative. 10 
Another offence contemplated under this class of offences is the 
crime of perjury in criminal and civil proceedings. Our-law does not give a 
definition of this crime which is called false testimony in other systems of 
law. According to Crivellari perjury "si fa consistere in un giuramento falso 
scientemente prestato da una delle parti" .11 This is criminal not only 
because it is immoral but also for the real damage caused to the 
administration of justice; and if it occurs in civil cases, can be used as an 
instrument of fraud and theft. 
In the United Kingdom, the law relating to perjury is the 
Perjury Act 1911 and runs as follows: "if any person lawfully sworn as a 
witness or as an interpreter in a judicial proceeding wilfully makes a 
statement material in that proceeding which a) he knows to be false or 
b) does not believe to be true, he shall be guilty of perjury" . 12 
Perjury proper is dealt with in Sections 102, 103 and 104 of our 
Criminal Law; the first two relate to perjury in criminal proceedings and the 
other to perjury in civil proceedings. Although no definition is available in 
our code, perjury can be defined as any false statement in civil or criminal 
proceedings, material in such proceedings wilfully made by any witness, 
referee or interpreter lawfully sworn by the court. Perjury may therefore be 
said to require the following four essential ingredients: 
a) testimony, reference or interpretation in judicial proceedings 
whether civil or ciminal; 
b) an oath lawfully administered by the competent authority; 
c) falsity of such testimony, reference interpretation in a 
material particular; 
d) wilfulness of such falsity or ciminal intent. 
With regards to (a) perjury cannot arise except if testimony, 
10. Crivellari, op. cit. 
11. ibid. 
12. Smith & Hogan, Criminal Law, 4th Ed., 1978, Butterworth's, p.71. 
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reference or interpretation has been given during a cause before a court. 
Falsity committed in any other case may constitute the crime of forgery or if 
an oath is required the crime of extra-judicial perjury, but not the crime of 
false testimony. 
'Testimony' or personal evidence as distinct from real evidence 
means any statement or declaration possessed of probative force in respect 
of the facts stated or declared, made before a competent court under oath 
according to the provisions of the law. 
'Reference' or expert opinion is the report ordered by the 
competent court to be made by referees or experts in cases where for the 
examination of a person or thing special knowledge or skill is required. 
'Interpretation' refers to the situation in which the court 
appoints an interpreter where a person taking part in court proceedings is 
deaf and dumb or unable to write and such interpretation is given an oath. 
Both parties in a civil suit and the accused in civil cases may give 
evidence. In so doing the parties are considered as witnesses and the 
provisions of the law relating to witnesses apply to such parties so that they 
may also be convicted of perjury. In fact in Police vs Rita Portelli the court 
said: "id-disposizzjoni tal-ligi Ii tikkontempla 1-kaz ta' min jaghti xhieda 
falza f'materja dvili tghodd ukoll jekk dak Ii jaghti xhieda falza ikun parti 
fil-kawza dvili fejn jaghti dik ix-xhieda" . 13 This is also the position held by 
Maino. 
A person may be convicted of this crime only if the false 
testimony has been given in judicial proceedings. The Italian Criminal Code 
speaks of those who depose before the judicial authority. According to 
Manzini this includes both the common and the special judicial authorities. 
Ecclesiastical tribunals are excluded, but court martials are not. 
In the United Kingdom, 1(2) of Perjury Act 1911 states that the 
expression judicial proceedings includes a proceedings before any Court, 
tribunal or person having by law power to hear, receive and examine 
evidence on oath. 14 
The relevant sections of our code speak of civil proceedings and 
criminal proceedings. Proceedings here mean court proceedings but the 
term must not be taken to include all court proceedings. Its meaning is 
limited to that of a cause, that is to say contentious proceedings which call 
for a decision. Consequently, false testimony given in proceedings before 
the court of voluntary jurisdiction does not fall under this crime. The same 
holds good for false testimony given before the Court of Magistrates sitting 
in the capacity of a court of criminal inquiry because such proceedings do 
not constitute a trial where a final decision is given. 
If the Court before which the proceedings are brought lacks 
jurisdiction, perjury is impossible. 
The second requisite for perjury to exist is that the false 
testimony shall have been given on oath lawfully administered by the 
13. Police v. Rita Porte/Ii, Law Reports, Vol. XXXIII p.662. 
14. Smith & Hogan, op. cit., p.713. 
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competent authority. In other systems of law, like the Italian system, this 
requirement is not essential. But in our law if the testimony is not given on 
oath, no statement or affirmation however false, will constitute the crime. 
The situation as it obtains in England according to the Oaths Act 1888 is 
that one is permitted to affirm if he objects to taking of an oath on 
the grounds that he has no religious belief or the taking of oaths is 
not permitted by his religion. 15 This was extended by the Oaths Act 
of 1961 to whom it is not reasonably practical to administer an oath 
in the manner appropriate to his belief. In England, according to the Oaths 
Act, a person who has affirmed is subject to the law of perjury just as if 
ceremony used is immaterial as long as the person who administered them 
has authority and that they are accepted by the person taking the oath. 16 
Hence if an atheist has agreed to swear on the Holy Bible, it would not later 
be an excuse to annul the testimony. The principles in English Law in this 
matter are completely coherant to our law. In Maltese law, the oath has not 
only a religious significance but also a legal one, the reason being that from 
the religious point of view, once a person answers what he is interrogated he 
IJlaY feel a further· duty to disclose everything that may be relevant to the 
proceedings without being interrogated about them. Legally he has no such 
obligation. The authorities which are competent to administer the oath are 
those expressly indicated by the law i.e. every court and every judge and 
magistrate including judges' assistants according to recent legislation. 
C. Falsity: 
In dealing with false testimony our law simply speaks of 'giving 
false testimony' without specifying. English Law goes further and punishes 
the witness who being lawfully sworn in a judicial proceeding wilfully 
makes a statement material to that proceeding which he knows to be false or 
does not believe to be true. On the other hand in Article 372 the Italian code 
speaks of the witness who 'inanzi alla autorita giudiziaria afferme ii falso o 
nega ii vero, averso face in tutto o in parte cio che sa intorno ai fatti sui 
quali e interrogato'. 
Our code does not analyse the element of falsity but the same 
rules should apply. It is evident that mere refusal to testify does not mean 
perjury; such refusal is itself a crime (Section 515). Such refusal must not, 
however, be confused with the failure to disclose anything the witness may 
know about the facts. The oath is taken as power to speak the whole truth 
as far as he knows it. Therefore if he leaves out something he knows or says 
he knows nothing he fails in his duty and if he does it in bad faith or with 
criminal intent he is guilty of the crime of false testimony. The same may be 
said with regard to negative statements i.e. those in which the witness denies 
having seen or heard the facts on which his evidence is required. In fact 
Carrara says "ii criterio della falsita della testimonianza non dipende dal 
15. ibid. atp.712. 
16. ibid. 
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rapporto fra ii detto e la realta delle cose ma dal rapporta fra ii detto e la 
scienza del testimonio" . 17 
But in all cases in order that the crime of false testimony may 
subsist it is necessary that the falsity be material to the cause. This is 
expressly required in the UK Perjury Act 1914. If therefore the falsity falls 
upon irrelevant circumstances which whether true or false could in no way 
influence the result, the crime cannot arise because no possibility of injury 
which alone justifies the punishment would exist (Section 153 of Criminal 
Code & Section 554, 589 of Code of Organization & Civil Procedure). 
The Italian Code mentions three ways in which evidence may be 
said to be false: (1) by affirming what is false; (2) by denying what is true; 
(3) by reticence. 
(1) A witness affirms what is false when he makes a positive 
statement which does not conform to his knowledge of the facts or 
circumstances with which such statement deals, such as when one pretends 
to have received a perception which in fact he has not perceived or alters 
that perception which in fact he has had. 
(2) A witness denies the truth when he makes a negative 
statement which does not conform to his knowledge of the facts or 
circumstances with which such statement is concerned. The witness may 
deny altogether that he has received these perceptions which in fact he 
received or while not denying the particular fact or circumstances, he denies 
that such fact or circumstance took place in the time, or place or manner 
that he knows it to have taken place. 
(3) The Italian and Maltese notion of perjury includes 
reticence i.e. the failure to disclose in whole or in part that which the witness 
knows about the particular factum probandum. The English Perjury Act 
does not include this form of false testimony. Failure to disclose is different 
from refusal to give evidence or to answer any question put to the witness in 
court. Such refusal may constitute the crime contemplated in Section 515 or 
130 of the Criminal Code but not the crime of perjury. 
The fourth element: The formal element of this offence consists 
in the consciousness of uttering a falsehood or concealing the truth. Any 
error of forgetfulness excludes the criminal intent. Consequently it is 
necessary to prove this criminal intent. (Chaveau et Helie). 18 On the other 
hand, however, the criminal intent need not consist in the wish to injure any 
particular person. The question whether there was this criminal intent is one 
of fact, the solution of which depends on the particular circumstances of the 
case. The point is not settled among the authorities whether a person is liable 
to the punishment for false testimony who makes a false deposition to save 
himself. Article 384, of the Italian Code, exempts from punishment any 
person who, by manifesting the truth would inevitably expose himself or a 
close relative to a grave injury to his liberty or his reputation. Under our law 
the position would appear to be as follows: as regards the accused he is 
17. Carrara, op. cit., para. 2678 - 2698. 
18. Chaveau et Helie, No. 307?.. 
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competent though not a compellable witness, and since all the provisions 
relating to witnesses shall apply to the accused giving evidence on oath, if he 
makes a false deposition, he becomes guilty of a false testimony. As regards 
all other witnesses the general rule is that no witness can be compelled to 
answer questions which might subject him to a criminal prosecution. But if 
the witness does not claim the privilege to which he is entitled and gives his 
reply on oath he cannot alter or pervert the truth and if he does he is guilty 
of false testimony (Police vs Vassallo 1948). However, if he was wrongly 
compelled by the court to give a reply, then if he gives a false answer, it does 
not seem that he could be held guilty of a crime. What we have said applies 
only to the position which might expose the witness himself to criminal 
proceedings. Finally, persons bound to secrecy by their profession e.g. 
advocates and priests may not be compelled to disclose certain matters 
which the law itself covers with privilege (Section 638 of Criminal Corie and 
Sections 587 & 689 (2) Code of Organisation & Civil Procedure). 
D. Retraction: 
Italian law provides that in case of perjury: "ii colpevole non e 
punibile se, nel procedimento penale in cui ha prestato ii suo ufficio, ritratta 
ii falso e manifesta ii vero prima che l'istruzione sia chiusa con sentenza di 
non doversi procedire, ovvero rinvista a cazione della falsita ... Ia falsita sia 
intervenuta in una cause civile, ii colpevole non e punibile se ritratta ii 
falso e manifesta ii vero prima che sulla domanda giudiziale sia 
pronunciata sentenza difinitiva anche se non irrevocabile" . 14 (Article Sib). 
Our Criminal Code does not contain any express provision to 
this effect. But the principle of retraction has been accepted in our case-law. 
In the appeal case Rex vs P. Borg the accused was charged with having 
knowingly purchased stolen property and moreover with having given false 
evidence. With regard to the charge of perjury, counsel for the defence 
contended that there had been timely reteraction and, therefore, there was 
no offence. The Court (C. Borg C.J., Edg. Ganado & Harding J.J.) held 
that retraction, if timely, negatives the offence - it is timely if made before 
the termination of the proceedings. The principle the Court held, may be 
inferred from Section 601 of the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure 
applied to criminal proceedings by Section 641 of the Criminal Code. That 
Section lays down that if the witness or interpreter at any time before the 
hearing of the case is concluded wishes to make any addition or correction, 
the Court shall allow such addition or correction and shall give weight 
thereto according to circumstances. 
There is no doubt that retraction comes well within the notion 
of "any addition or correction" mentioned by the Law in section 601 of the 
Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure and section 641 of the Criminal 
Code. The provision also indicates the time within which retraction is to be 
admissable. 
The main reason why our courts have endorsed this principle of 
retraction is that the different parts of testimony form one whole. Hence 
such a testimony cannot be considered complete and irrevocable except 
r 
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when the discussion on the cause is closed. Section 515 of the Criminal Code 
says that the courts may lead a witness who has been drifting away from the 
truth back to it, by warning him, keeping him apart, or even arresting him 
Yet even in such a case, the witness is free from any punishment if he 
retracts. Moreover, it is sufficient if the retraction is voluntary. No 
spontaneity is necessary. 
In Malta, if retraction takes place during the Appeal Stage there 
is no liability. In Italy as soon as particular proceedings are closed i.e. when 
the sentence of the Court of 1st instance is given, one is liable even if one 
attempts retraction on appeal. 
Crivellari also points out that if the offender retracts the 
accusation or reveals the simulation before any proceedings against the 
victim, there is a lessening of punishment. If the retraction happens 
afterwards but before the verdict is pronounced, there is lessening of 
punishment but not to the extent aforestated. 19 In Section 16 of the Criminal 
Code we read that if the Criminal Court feels that the witness is given a false 
testimony, it can order that the person be put under the Court of Judicial 
Police for the necessary enquiry. If the situation occurs under the Court of 
Judicial Police this court shall act ex officio. This power is also vested in the 
Civil Courts. Here, the point arises whether the witness under enquiry still 
has the right of retraction. If the witness retracts at this stage he may be free 
from liability if the proceedings of the cause have not yet been closed. If 
however on account of the witness concerned the court proceedings would 
have had to come to a standstill, till the proceedings of the false testimony 
are terminated, he cannot any longer retract. The reason is that in such a 
case the decree by the court of suspension until the proceedings of perjury are 
over is regarded as closing the hearing of the cause at this stage. Witness has 
hindered justice to such a degree that he can no longer be liberated from any 
punishment not even if he volontarily retracts during the enquiry stage 
before the Court of Judicial Police. 
E. False Swearing: 
This subject is dealt with in the Criminal Code in various 
sections. Section 105 extends the punishment of false testimony to referees 
or experts or interpreters. The moral element of this crime is clearly 
indicated by the words "knowingly" and "maliciously". Here the law 
punishes the deliberate and intentional perversion of the truth. Section 100 
deals with the crime of subornation of false testimony, false reference or 
false interpretation. Subornation is the instigation to commit any one of the 
crimes mentioned in this section. It is the procuring of a business to make a 
false testimony or of a referee to make a false report, or of an interpreter to 
make a false interpretation in each case in a civil or a criminal cause. Section 
101 deals with fabrication or production of false evidence. Documentary 
evidence plays a very important part in most judicial trials. Therefore any 
person who prepares, puts together or brings up any false document for the 
19. Crivellari, op. cil. 
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purposes of any criminal or civil proceedings, and any person who 
knowingly produces any false document although he may not have himself 
prepared or brought up such document, are dealt with by the law as if they 
had themselves originally forged the document. 
Judicial perjury is dealt with in Section 106. This section deals 
with false statements on oath made otherwise than by a witness or a party, 
or the accused or a referee in a civil or criminal cause, or by an interpreter in 
a judicial proceeding. 
The elements of this crime are: 
1. a false statement 
2. wilfully made 
3. on oath 
4. before a person authorised by law to administer oaths 
Section 110 speaks of the offence which consists in deterring a 
person from coming forward to give necessary information or evidence in a 
civil or criminal cause or to the competent authority. 
The second species of the same offence consists in knowingly 
suppressing, destorying or altering the traces, or the factual evidence of an 
offence. 
